John Paulson: Der Trade des Jahrhunderts

so ein Pech aber auch! Der war schon wieder!

Beim nächsten soll aber exclusiv für uns geläutet werden.

@ dhp05 [#2]

Ich bombardiere Herrn Paulson seit Monaten mit der Bitte, der TMW Gemeinde seine Strategien zukommen zu lassen, praedestino sozusagen. Aber er antwortet einfach nicht...

Hat jemand das Buch schon gelesen?

Wäre interessant, welchen Einsatz Paulson & Co riskiert haben. Für 15 Mrd. Gewinn braucht man einen beständigen Trend, eine gut abgesicherte Info und sehr viel Eigen- und Fremdkapital.

Ob da wohl die üblichen MM-Regeln eingehalten werden? Mit 2% Risiko kann man solche Beträge nicht verdienen.

Mit fremdem Geld sollte man eigentlich besonders vorsichtig agieren, manche bad boys machen das Gegenteil, wenn's gut geht.

MfG

hw

@ hardworker [#4]
But Paulson was convinced this was his chance to make his mark....

Timing is everything, though. Initially, Paulson and the others lost tens of millions of dollars as real estate and stocks continued to soar. Rather than back down, however, Paulson redoubled his bets, putting his hedge fund and his reputation on the line.

Definitiv kein MM, außer "All In" in eine Sache von der man überzeugt ist. Es war einfach eine Wette auf ein Szenario. Wenn man es vorher so deklariert ist es ok. Nur wenn man mit Kamikaze Strategien 100% sichere 20%er auf ewig verspricht, ist das nur Dummenfang. Was Paulson gemacht hat, war doch ok soweit ich das aus dem Text lesen kann.

Viele Grüße

Keiner von uns weiß, welches Volumen die Fonds von Paulson hatten und wie er die einzelnen Instrumente gewichtete, mit denen er auf den Verfall des Immobilienmarktes wettete. Somit sind Urteile darüber müßig.

Ob der Autor genaue Dokumente einsehen konnte, bleibt abzuwarten. Bis zum 03.11. ist es ja nicht mehr so lang.

Paulson selbst hat in mehreren Interviews - die werdet Ihr doch gelesen haben? - betont, das vor allem der Leerverkauf bestimmter Tranchen von Kredit "gesicherten" Anleihen ein überragendes Chance / Risiko Verhältnis besaß, weil diese nahe Parität gehandelt wurden, während die Anzahl der ausfallenden Kredite stieg und stieg.

Ein Trade übrigens, der den Wert der "Efficient Market Theory" zeigt, derzufolge alle verfügbaren Informationen im Kurs enthalten sind, lol!

Danke an gautama und JRM.

Es war also eine sehr, sehr heiße Wette. Sowas muß man auch aushalten können. Auch wenn das reward/risk- Verhältnis scheinbar gut ist, man weiß nie ob irgendeine Gegenmaßnahme der Regierung oä die Sache verzögert oder behindert oder gar zerstört.

Bei mir verursachen 2 DAXe overnight schon einen Pulsanstieg wie früher beim Ausfragen in Heimatkunde.

MfG

hw

Als Vorspeise - ein Auszug aus dem Buch, gestern im WSJ online zu lesen:

It was the fall of 2007, financial markets were collapsing, and Wall Street firms were losing massive amounts of money, as if they were trying to give back a decade's worth of profits in a few brutal months. An investor named John Paulson somehow was scoring huge profits. His winnings were so enormous they seemed unreal, even cartoonish. His firm, Paulson & Co., would make $15 billion in 2007.

Mr. Paulson's personal cut would amount to nearly $4 billion, or more than $10 million a day. That was more than the 2007 earnings of J. K. Rowling, Oprah Winfrey and Tiger Woods put together. At one point in late 2007, a broker called to remind Mr. Paulson of a personal account worth $5 million, an account now so insignificant it had slipped his mind.

Mr. Paulson, known as J.P., bet that the housing market would collapse and risky mortgages would tumble in value. The moves put the fund manager from Queens, N.Y., alongside Warren Buffett, George Soros, and Bernard Baruch in Wall Street's pantheon of traders. And as one rival fund manager later would say, with equal parts envy and respect, "Paulson's not even a housing or mortgage guy.... Until this trade, he was run-of-the-mill, nothing special."

John Paulson launched his hedge fund in 1994. His forte was investing in corporate mergers that he viewed as the most likely to be completed, among the safest forms of investing. When he met with clients, they sometimes were surprised by his limp handshake and restrained manner, both unusual in an industry full of bluster. Younger hedge-fund traders went tieless and dressed casually, feeling confident in their abilities thanks to their soaring profits and growing stature. Mr. Paulson stuck with dark suits and muted ties.

By early 2006 the 49-year-old Mr. Paulson had reached his twilight years in accelerated Wall Street-career time. He had been eclipsed by a group of investors who had amassed huge fortunes in a few years. It was the fourth year of a spectacular surge in housing prices, the likes of which the nation never had seen. Everyone seemed to be making money hand over fist. Everyone but John Paulson.

"This is crazy," Mr. Paulson said to Paolo Pellegrini, one of his analysts.

Mr. Pellegrini felt his own pressures. A year earlier, the stylish native of Italy had called Mr. Paulson looking for a job after a career of disappointments. Paulson & Co. likely was his last stop on Wall Street.

Mr. Pellegrini spent hours in Mr. Paulson's office, debating how to deduce a turn in the housing market. Mr. Paulson charged Mr. Pellegrini with figuring out whether homes were, in fact, overpriced. Late at night, in his cubicle, Mr. Pellegrini tracked home prices across the country since 1975. Interest rates seemed to have no bearing on real estate. Grasping for new ideas, Mr. Pellegrini added a "trend line" that clearly illustrated how much prices had surged lately. He then performed a "regression analysis" to smooth the ups and downs.

The answer was in front of him: Housing prices had climbed a puny 1.4% annually between 1975 and 2000, after inflation. But they had soared over 7% in the following five years, until 2005. The upshot: U.S. home prices would have to drop by almost 40% to return to their historic trend line. Not only had prices climbed like never before, but Mr. Pellegrini's figures showed that each time housing had dropped in the past, it fell through the trend line, suggesting that an eventual drop likely would be brutal.

"This is unbelievable!" Mr. Paulson said the next morning. The chart was Mr. Paulson's Rosetta Stone enabling him to make sense of the housing market. They had to figure out how to profit from it.

“On the ATM screen was a figure she had never seen before: $45 million. It was part of her husband's 2007 bonus, a surprise deposit in their joint account. ”

By the spring, Mr. Paulson was convinced he had discovered the perfect trade. Insurance on risky home mortgages was trading at dirt-cheap prices. He would buy boatloads of credit-default swaps—or investments that served as insurance on risky mortgage debt. When housing hit the skids and homeowners defaulted on their mortgages, this insurance would rise in value—and Mr. Paulson would make a killing. If he could convince enough investors to back him, he could start a fund dedicated to this trade.

As Mr. Paulson and his team described their investment thesis to Nolan Randolph, an executive of a Texas firm Crestline Investors and an existing Paulson & Co. client, Mr. Randolph kept shaking his head. "We don't think your fund will add alpha," Mr. Randolph said, using the industry lingo for value. The downside was too big if the trade didn't pay off, he said. He turned them down.

Hoping to claim his alma mater, Harvard University, as an early client for his fund, Mr. Paulson traveled to Boston to meet with Mark Taborsky, who helped pick hedge funds for Harvard's endowment.

Mr. Taborsky was wary. Mr. Paulson's fund was willing to lose 8% a year to buy the mortgage insurance, which seemed like a lot. Mr. Taborsky also thought Mr. Paulson might be excessively gloomy about the housing market. Mr. Taborsky turned him down, too.

Even some investors who agreed with Mr. Paulson's view that housing prices would tumble doubted he would make much money because there was relatively little trading in the investments he was buying. He might have a hard time selling his investments without sending prices tumbling, shrinking any profits, they said.

"It looked like a dangerous game, taking one single bet that might be difficult to unwind," said Jack Doueck, a principal at Stillwater Capital, a New York firm that parcels out money to funds. He, too, said no to Mr. Paulson's fund.

Mr. Paulson's growing fixation on housing began to spark doubts about his business. One long-time client, big Swiss bank Union Bancaire Privée, received an urgent warning from a contact that Mr. Paulson was "straying" from his longtime focus, and that the bank should pull its money from Paulson & Co., fast. The bank stuck with Mr. Paulson but turned down his new fund.

By the summer of 2006, Mr. Paulson had managed to raise $147 million, mostly from friends and family, to launch a fund. Soon, Josh Birnbaum, a top Goldman Sachs trader, began calling and asked to come by his office. Sitting across from Mr. Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini, and his top trader, Brad Rosenberg, Mr. Birnbaum got to the point.

Not only were Mr. Birnbaum's clients eager to buy some of the mortgages that Paulson & Co. was betting against, but Mr. Birnbaum was, too. Mr. Birnbaum and his clients expected the mortgages, packaged as securities, to hold their value. "We've done the work and we don't see them taking losses," Mr. Birnbaum said.

After Mr. Birnbaum left, Mr. Rosenberg walked into Mr. Paulson's office, a bit shaken. Mr. Paulson seemed unmoved. "Keep buying, Brad," Mr. Paulson told Mr. Rosenberg.

Months into their new fund, Mr. Paulson and Mr. Pellegrini were eager to find more ways to bet against risky mortgages. Accumulating mortgage insurance in the market sometimes proved slow. They soon found a creative and controversial way to enlarge their trade.

They met with bankers at Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, and other firms to ask if they would create securities—packages of mortgages called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs—that Paulson & Co. could wager against.

The investment banks would sell the CDOs to clients who believed the value of the mortgages would hold up. Mr. Paulson would buy CDS insurance on the CDO mortgage investments—a bet that they would fall in value. This way, Mr. Paulson could wager against $1 billion or so of mortgage debt in one fell swoop.

Paulson & Co. wasn't doing anything new. A few other hedge funds also worked with banks to short CDOs the banks were creating. Hundreds of other CDOs were being created at the time. Other bankers, including those at Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, didn't see anything wrong with Mr. Paulson's request and agreed to work with his team.

At Bear Stearns, however, Scott Eichel, a senior trader, and others met with Mr. Paulson and later turned him down. Mr. Eichel said he felt it would look improper for his firm. "On the one hand, we'd be selling the deals" to investors, without telling them that a bearish hedge fund was the impetus for the transaction, Mr. Eichel told a colleague; on the other hand, Bear Stearns would be helping Mr. Paulson wager against the deals.

Some investors later would argue that Mr. Paulson's actions indirectly led to the creation of additional dangerous CDO investments, resulting in billions of dollars of additional losses for those who owned the CDO slices.

At the time, though, Mr. Paulson still wasn't sure his trade would work. He simply was buying protection, he said. "We didn't create any securities, we never sold the securities to investors," Mr. Paulson said. "We always thought they were bad loans."

Paulson & Co. eventually bet against about $5 billion of CDOs. Months later, they had made more than $4 billion of profits from these trades—including $500 million from a single transaction—according to the hedge fund's investors and an employee of the firm.

One of the biggest losers was the bank that worked with Mr. Paulson on many of the deals: Deutsche Bank. The big bank had failed to sell all of the CDO deals it constructed and was stuck with chunks of toxic mortgages, suffering about $500 million of losses from these customized transactions, according to a senior executive of the German bank.

In late 2007, Mr. Pellegrini took his wife on vacation in Anguilla. Stopping at an automated-teller machine in the hotel lobby to withdraw some cash, she checked the balance of their checking account.

On the screen before her was a figure she had never seen before, at least not on an ATM. It's not clear how many others ever had, either: $45 million, newly deposited in their joint account. It was part of Mr. Pellegrini's bonus that year.

"Wow," his wife said quietly, staring at the ATM.

They left, arm in arm, meeting a chartered boat to take them to nearby St. Barts.

Mr. Paulson's personal tally for 2007: nearly $4 billion. It was the largest one-year payout in the history of the financial markets. The next year, he made another $5 billion for his firm by betting against financial companies with exposure to housing.

By the middle of 2009, a record one in 10 Americans was delinquent or in foreclosure on their mortgages. U.S. housing prices had fallen more than 30% from their 2006 peak. In cities such as Miami, Phoenix, and Las Vegas, real-estate values dropped more than 40%. Several million people lost their homes. And more than 30% of U.S. home owners held mortgages that were underwater, or greater than the value of their houses, the highest level in 75 years.

As Mr. Paulson and others at his office discussed how much was being spent by the United States and other nations to rescue areas of the economy crippled by the financial collapse, he discovered his next targets, certain they were as doomed to collapse as subprime mortgages once had been: the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.

Mr. Paulson made a calculation: The supply of dollars had expanded by 120% over several months. That surely would lead to a drop in its value, and an eventual surge in inflation. "What's the only asset that will hold value? It's got to be gold," Mr. Paulson argued.

Paulson & Co. had never dabbled in gold, and had no currency experts. He was also one of many warming to gold investments, worrying some investors. Some investors withdrew money from the fund, pushing his assets down to $28 billion or so.

Mr. Paulson acknowledged that his was a straightforward argument, but he paid the critics little heed.

"Three or four years from now, people will ask why they didn't buy gold earlier," Mr. Paulson said.

He purchased billions of dollars of gold investments. Betting against the dollar would be his new trade.

Quelle:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703574604574499740849179448.html

Was soll daran so eindrucksvoll - abgesehen vom Volumen - sein?

Das ist doch eine typische Once In A Lifetime Geschichte. Solche Phänomene sind selten aber kommen vor.

Man kann auch den Lotto Super Jackpot knacken. Deswegen ist man noch lange kein herausragender Investor.

Fooled by Randomness - und rückwirkend als herausragende Stratgie einer herausragenden Fähigkeit rationalisiert.

@ tradexxx [#9]

Lotto ist nur Dusel. Und sonst nichts. Das kannst Du nicht vergleichen.

Jeder Buffett, jeder erfolgreiche Baulöwe und jeder Erfinder brauchen zum ganz großen Wurf Randomness und Money Management und eine gewisse, bisher angewachsene Größe. Sonst kann man nur big percentual bets zustandebringen. Bei big absolute bets muß einfach alles zusammenkommen, hier hast Du wieder recht.

MfG

hw

@ tradexxx [#9]

Lol, von Dir eine solche Aussage, das ist allerdings enttäuschend. Hättest Du Dir die Mühe gemacht, John Paulson's Biographie etwas genauer zu studieren und seine vorherige Tätigkeit u.a. für Leon Levy und Martin Gruss, wüßtest Du, das er ganz sicher das Prädikat "herausragend" verdient.