Rohöl: Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract
Aus dem letzten Middle East Economic Survey zum geplanten Oman Ölkontrakt für sour crude oil.
VOL. XLIX
No 37
11-Sept-2006
REGIONAL/OMAN/OIL PRICES
Middle East Crude Pricing And The Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract: A Critical Assessment
By Bassam Fattouh
The following is an abridged version of an Energy Comment published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) in August 2006. Dr Fattouh is a Reader in Finance and Management in the Department of Financial and Management Studies, SOAS, University of London and Senior Research Fellow at OIES. The contents of this paper are the author’s sole responsibility.
In June 2006, the Dubai Mercantile Exchange Limited (DME) announced the details of the Oman crude oil futures contract, the first to be established in the Middle East. Although the full details of the terms and conditions remain confidential, the key elements have been made public. The size of the contract will be 1,000 barrels to be settled daily at the close of the Singapore trading day. It will be based on physical delivery using Oman’s crude oil storage and loading installations. Physical delivery requires a minimum position of 200,000 barrels, below which outstanding transactions will be settled on a cash basis. Petroleum Development of Oman (PDO) and DME will be responsible for delivery matching. The DME wants transactions to be cleared through NYMEX.1
There is little doubt that establishing a tradable futures contract in the region is desirable. The reliance on Brent and WTI futures contracts for price discovery is no longer ideal for Middle East crude oil sellers and their buyers, mainly Asian customers. The WTI and Brent benchmarks are useful for pricing sweet crude oil, less so for pricing sour crudes which represent a large share of Middle Eastern exports. The reliance on Dubai spot market quotations for the 10mn b/d or so of exports to the Asia-Pacific region has posed serious problems as Dubai’s production has fallen sharply in recent years. The introduction of a new futures contract with the potential to constitute the basis of a new pricing mechanism represents a much needed step.
The main question is however: can a futures contract based on Omani crude efficiently perform the role of price discovery? In order to answer this question, it is important to look more closely at how the current oil pricing system operates and the recent shift to the futures market for oil price discovery and price setting. We can then assess whether the proposed Oman oil futures contract satisfies the necessary conditions for it to play the role of a benchmark in pricing Middle Eastern crude oil exports.
The Current Oil Pricing Regime2
Formula pricing constitutes the basis of the current international oil pricing regime. The formula used in pricing oil is straightforward: the price of a certain variety of crude oil is set as a differential to a certain marker or reference price. The most important element of formula pricing is the identification of the reference or benchmark crude. Brent, WTI and Dubai-Oman are the main crude oil benchmarks of the current oil pricing system. Nearly all oil traded outside America and the Far East is priced using Brent as a benchmark. WTI is the main benchmark used for pricing oil imports into the US. Dubai-Oman is used as a benchmark for Gulf crudes (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) sold in the Asia-Pacific market.
In the early stages of the current oil pricing system which emerged in the period 1986-88, crude oil was priced off the spot market quotations of these benchmarks (namely dated Brent, spot WTI and Dubai) as assessed by oil reporting agencies such as Platts and Petroleum Argus. In the last few years however, there have been some serious doubts about the ability of the spot physical market to generate a price that reflects accurately the margin of the physical barrel of oil. One of the main problems is that very little actual trading occurs in these crudes which makes the process of price discovery very difficult.
This problem has greatly affected Dubai marker. Dubai became the main price marker for the region by default as it was one of the few Gulf crudes available for sale on the spot market. However, the volume of Dubai crude production has dropped from a peak of 400,000 b/d in the period 1990−95 to under 120,000 b/d in 2004, with production hovering around 100,000 b/d in 2005.3 In 2006, Dubai crude continued to fall and, according to Petroleum Argus (10 July, 2006), Dubai is currently producing about 90,000 b/d ie around five cargoes each month, with only four of these traded on the spot market (the remaining cargo is shipped by the producer ConocoPhillips to its refineries).
Shift To The Futures Market
The declining liquidity of the physical base of the reference crudes and the narrowness of the spot market have caused many oil-exporting and consuming countries to look for an alternative market to derive the price of the reference crude. The alternative was found in the futures market. For instance, instead of using dated Brent for its exports to Europe, several major oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran rely on the IPE Brent Weighted Average (BWAVE) as the basis of pricing crude exports to Europe.
The shift to futures market was justified by the perceived inadequacies of the spot market which have become vulnerable to manipulation, distortions and squeezes. Also, a futures price is, after all, determined by actual transactions in the futures exchanges and not on the basis of some assessed prices by oil reporting agencies. Furthermore, the timely availability of futures prices enhances price transparency. The volume of daily transactions and open positions is additional useful information to gauge the liquidity of the market. Thus, the move towards establishing an oil futures contract for pricing Middle East sour crudes can be seen as part of a more general shift in the international pricing system to the futures market for crude oil price discovery. This shift is seen by many observers as necessary to deal with the shortcomings of the spot Dubai market for price discovery.
But why not rely on the highly liquid WTI and Brent futures markets for price discovery and pricing Gulf oil exports to Asia? The answer is that neither of these two comes close to representing the type of crude oil in the region which is mainly sour. More generally, it is often argued that WTI and Brent no longer represent the marginal barrel of oil. Furthermore, marginal refining capacity in the world cannot process heavy, sour crudes. The conversion of existing refining capacity to deal with this new reality is expensive and slow. Faced with this refining bottleneck and the increasing trend towards sourer and heavier slate, the relative demand for sweet oil continues to rise, creating a large wedge between sweet crude and sour crude prices. This represents a fundamental change in oil markets; and pressures to change the world benchmarks to heavier more sour crudes have become paramount.
Potential Role Of Oman’s Futures Contract
To what extent can the proposed Omani futures contract play an efficient role in price discovery? Will it gain market participants’ confidence and attract enough liquidity to act as a useful benchmark in pricing sour crude oil in international trade? In order to answer these questions, we consider the following five aspects: the volume of Omani crude oil production, the diversification of ownership of Omani crude oil, the control of storage facilities, Oman’s official pricing mechanism, and the willingness of Gulf producers to adopt the new pricing system.
Like the other benchmarks, production in Oman has also been in decline. Oman’s total production, including condensates and other liquids, declined sharply from a peak of 972,000 b/d in 2000 to 754,000 b/d in 2004. In 2005, output recovered slightly and averaged around 780,000 b/d. This was mainly due to the introduction of additional EOR measures and increased production of NGLs. Declining oil production however is not an urgent problem facing Oman; based on current levels of production, and assuming cargo sizes of 500,000 barrels, Oman can trade a large number of cargoes per month on the spot market. In fact, Oman’s production is higher than that of Brent just before the co-mingling. However, it is important to note that what matters from a pricing point of view is the volume available for spot trade. Here the picture is not very clear. Like all other exporters from the region, the Omani government sells part of its oil on the basis of long-term contracts which by definition is not available for spot trading. Equally important, Oman recently announced it would cut export volumes in order to supply its new refinery at Sohar. This will reduce the number of cargoes available for the spot market.
Low volumes of crude oil available for spot trading make price discovery problematic and increase the vulnerability of markets to squeezes, distorting prices and undermining market confidence. A squeeze refers to a situation in which a trader goes long in a forward market by an amount that exceeds the actual physical cargoes that can be loaded during that month. If successful, the squeezer will claim delivery from sellers who are short and will obtain cash settlement involving a premium. It is true that all markets are prone to squeezes and in the last few years there have been occasions on which the Brent market was subject to successful squeezes. But it is also true that it is easier to squeeze thinner markets.
The concentration of oil ownership and storage facilities is a prime factor affecting the success of certain crudes acting as a benchmark. In order to understand why, let’s examine the main factors that allowed Brent to take a privileged position within the current oil pricing regime. In the early 1980s the volume of production in the Brent market was quite large and ensured enough physical liquidity. But similar bases of physical liquidity could be found in other regions of the world, especially in OPEC which constituted (and still does) the largest physical market for crude oil to justify the choice of Brent price as a marker. Thus, the volume of production, though important, is not the determining factor for the choice of a marker. Horsnell and Mabro (1993) identify additional determinants, the most important of which is ownership diversification.4 The commodity underlying the forward/futures contracts should be available from a wide range of sellers and not from a single seller. Every country in OPEC is a single seller and hence OPEC crudes did not (and still do not) satisfy this criterion of ownership diversification. This is in contrast to the Brent market which has always been characterized by a large number of companies with entitlement to the production of Brent.
Omani crude oil production is almost totally controlled by PDO. There is an array of foreign and private domestic oil companies, but these constitute a small share of total oil output. In 2004, PDO average annual production amounted to 661,000 b/d which accounted for around 93% of the country’s total crude oil production. PDO is owned by the Omani government (60%), Shell (34%), Total (4%) and Partex (2%). This structure has remained stable since 1977.
Monopoly of production increases the likelihood of manipulation, thereby increasing the risk exposure of buyers and traders who will therefore be reluctant to enter the market at all. This is only partially offset by the fact that PDO is a joint venture among various groups each with a certain entitlement to Omani crude production. It can be shown that if a dominant producer has enough market power, then even if market participants have rational expectations, the dominant producer has the incentive to destabilize the spot market and engage in destabilizing speculation in the futures market.5 More specific to this context, production should not be subject to manipulation or control by a dominant producer that could benefit in its trading positions from cutting and increasing production. Oman has no incentive to cut production and being outside OPEC it has no commitment to abide by production quotas. However, there is still some room for manipulation. For instance, by making fewer cargoes available in the spot market and selling more crude oil through long-term contracts, it could affect both spot and long-term contract prices. Given PDO’s dominant position in production, this requires some sort of self-imposed regulation that prevents parties from using their market power to influence prices. The extent to which these regulations are implemented will determine the success of the new futures contract in achieving its role of price discovery.
PDO’s control of physical infrastructure compounds this effect. The fear of manipulating markets by controlling infrastructure applies even to very mature and highly liquid markets such as NYMEX WTI futures contracts. The challenge of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the BP Amoco-Arco merger in 2000 was partly based on the fear that by controlling the physical infrastructure, the WTI futures market could be squeezed. The FTC noted that “the restriction of pipeline or storage capacity can affect the deliverable supply of crude oil in Cushing and consequently affect both WTI crude cash prices and NYMEX futures prices”. Then it stated that “a firm that controlled substantial storage in Cushing and pipeline capacity into Cushing would be able to manipulate NYMEX futures trading markets and then enhance its own positions at the expense of producers, refiners and traders”6. In Oman, the physical infrastructure is largely owned by PDO. The main oil terminal located at Mina al-Fahal is operated by PDO. The terminal also includes nine crude oil storage tanks which are likely to be used for matching physical deliveries. The concentration of production, storage, and uploading facilities owned by one company increases the vulnerability of markets to squeezes and manipulation by that dominant player.
There is also the issue of Oman’s official pricing mechanism. For the futures contract to have a realistic chance of working, it requires that Oman abandon its official pricing system. Having both an official price and futures market-related price undermines the market function as price discoverer unless there is convergence in price. As noted by Petroleum Argus (19 June 2006), “Oman crude is retroactively priced by the oil ministry and it is not clear how this system could continue to operate in parallel with Oman futures. Either Oman changes its pricing policy or the DME contract will fail”. Earlier this year, Oman commented that it would continue to set official prices on a retroactive basis. However, according to Reuters, Oil Minister Muhammad al-Rumhy says he is willing to consider an alternative pricing system if market participants suggest one.
Finally, the success of the proposed futures contract depends, to a large extent, on whether Gulf producers are willing to set their crude price against it. So far, none of the big gulf producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Iran has shown great enthusiasm towards this new contract nor said it is considering altering pricing policies. But this leaves us with an interesting question: If Oman’s futures contract is able to replace the previous system of spot price quotations, what alternative do these Gulf producers have? They can always use Brent to price their exports to Asia, a system which, though not ideal, has at least been tested.
Conclusions
Establishing a sour futures contract based on Omani crude represents an important step in the recent shift in the international oil pricing regime in which oil prices are increasingly being determined by the futures market. The proposed Oman futures contract is in a good position to assume this role. However, the need for a sour contract to take into account the changes in the crude mix and refining bottlenecks does not mean that it will automatically succeed. There have been various attempts to launch similar futures contracts in the past but with limited success. As has been argued, the benchmark crude should satisfy a certain set of conditions otherwise it will not gain participants’ confidence. Will this contract achieve the confidence required? Only time will tell.
Notes:
1. See: A Future in Crude for the Middle East, Gas & Oil Connections Vol 11, Issue No 10, 18 May 2006 http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm62068.htm; Gulf News, “Dubai Mercantile Exchange unveils details of Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract”, June 2006. http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/06/13/10046532.html
2. This and the next section partly draw on B Fattouh (2006), The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Pricing System: A Critical Assessment, in R Mabro (ed), Oil in the 21st Century, Oxford: OUP.
3. See J Montepeque, Sour Crude Pricing: A Pressing Global Issue (MEES, 4 April 2005).
4. See P Horsnell, and R Mabro (1993), Oil Markets and Prices: The Brent Market and the Formation of World Oil Prices, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Newbery, D M G (1984), ‘The Manipulation of Futures Markets by a Dominant Producer’, Chapter 2 in Anderson, R W (ed ), The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books).
6. United States of America Before Federal Trade Commission in the Matter of BP AMOCO P L C and Atlantic Richfield Company downloadable from http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/bparco.pdf
Quelle: http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v49n37-5OD01.htm
